

Approach To The Question Of Truth In The History Of Philosophy

Suhrob Panjiyev

Senior Lecturer, Department of Social Sciences, Termez University of Economics and Service, Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Phone: 99 678-87-88. Email: panjiyev87@mail.ru

Annotation. The article compares comparatively the views of philosophers of modern Western philosophers F. Bacon, R. Descartes, G.V. Leibniz, J. Locke, I. Kant and Hegel on the criterion of truth.

Key words: *Truth, problem of truth, criterion of truth, methodology, dogmatism, rationalism, empiricism, skepticism, substitution, materialism, agnosticism*

In the Middle Ages, disputes about truth subsided, but those branches of the tree of the problem of truth, which we found in ancient philosophy, can be traced in their developed and modified form in the works of philosophers of modern times.

The philosophical "night" of the Middle Ages, when the place of the free search for truth was taken by following the authorities of the Church and Revelation, put an end to F. Bacon and R. Descartes, who proclaimed two important methodological principles of the search for truth, aimed at overcoming the dogmatic (here this word is used in its modern meaning of uncritical adherence to certain provisions, and not in the ancient meaning of the statement of any provisions claiming to be a positive solution to the problem) of thinking. This refers to the Baconian struggle with "idols" and the Cartesian doubt. With a common desire for a free search for truth, these thinkers disagreed on the issue of the criterion of truth, i.e. what exactly (if not the authority) can certify the finding of the truth. R. Descartes, who laid the foundation for Western rationalism, considered the criterion of truth to be clarity and distinctness of judgments, and F. Bacon, the founder of English empiricism, declared experience, human sensations as such. In accordance with this difference in the criterion, G.V. Leibniz in "Monadology" identified two kinds of truth: "the truth of reason and the truth of fact. The truths of reason are necessary and the opposition is impossible; truths of fact are accidental, and the opposite is possible." G.V. Leibniz himself preferred the truths of reason.

If the empiricists continued the line going from the Cyrenaics, then the rationalists followed the concept of truth coming from the Eleatics. Under the auspices of rationalism, discussions about substances were conducted, and it was the substance with its properties (attributes) that was declared the haven of truth. English empiricists criticized the concept of substances: J. Locke - spiritual substance, J. Berkeley - material. J. Locke, in his doctrine of primary and secondary qualities, tried to define non-substantial objective truth. Essentially, rationalists and empiricists followed similar paths. Locke's primary (i.e. objective) qualities were also related to secondary (subjective) qualities, as the attributes of rationalists (true, i.e. substantial) were related to modes.

But both the empirical and the rationalistic conceptions of truth soon found their vulnerabilities and themselves began to be subject to Cartesian doubts. First of all, the introduced criteria of truth caused doubt. One and the same propositions could seem clear and distinct to some scientists and, on this basis, be declared true, to others, on the contrary, vague and therefore refer to false. The same is true for the criterion of experience. A variety of judgments follow from the same experimental data. Which

ones are true and which ones are false? Proceeding from the vulnerability of the truth criteria, the theories of the separation of qualities into primary and secondary ones and ideas about substances, attributes and modes were questioned. Skeptics entered the arena again.

The empiricist D. Hume and a little later the rationalist I. Kant, continuing the line of ancient skepticism, significantly shaken the seemingly solid "proofs" of the existence of objective truth as independent of man. According to I. Kant, the possibility of human sensations is determined by the presence of a priori (to experimental) forms of contemplation inherent in man. Creatures with a different structure of the sensitive apparatus, apparently, will perceive the world in a completely different way. Or is F. Engels right when he wrote that if people had a sixth sense, they could not, thanks to it, discover anything qualitatively new in the world? In any case, Kant's merit lies in the fact that he once again pointed out the problematic nature of judgments that go beyond the notions determined by the sensitive apparatus of a person. Just as we cannot be sure that we have divided the segment exactly into two equal parts, but we can only assert that we have divided it with an accuracy determined by the capabilities of our vision, so in the truth (if we consider it empirical) we can only be sure with accuracy our senses. Similarly, the very possibility of human knowledge, according to I. Kant, is determined by the presence of these a priori forms of thinking in a person. It is they who give the form of universality to the laws developed by science, whereas otherwise, from the fact that, say, the sun rises and sets every day, it would be impossible to conclude that it will rise tomorrow. Thus, Kant belongs to the substantiation of the possibility of the existence of scientific truth.

According to E. Hartmann, "the first and basic condition for the possibility of any cognition is to recognize the homogeneity of thinking and its transcendently objective object, for with the heterogeneity of thinking and things, no agreement between the two is simply impossible; truth "[1].

The condition of the homogeneity of thinking and the object is fulfilled only when the hypothesis of the identity of being and thinking is accepted, and it was I. Kant's indication of the conditions for comprehending absolute truth that stimulated the creation of the objective idealistic systems of F. Schelling and Hegel, in which the acceptance of this identity promised the truth. The one who accepts the principle of the identity of being and thinking must assert that the essence of being is based on a mental essence, an idea, and thus comes to absolute idealism, within the framework of which only the idea of the absolute in non-human truth is possible. Here, apparently, lies the key to Hegel's remark that true philosophy cannot be materialistic. Materialism is not able to substantiate philosophically (and therefore it tries to translate the conversation onto practical ground), how thought can comprehend not the mental essence, and without this all materialistic conclusions turn out to be built on sand.

The identity of being and thinking, however, can also be interpreted materialistically, understanding by this that the basis of thinking lies outside the mental essence and that in the process of the development of thinking it will increasingly become similar to the non-mental nature from which it was formed. This view, however, contradicts the direction of evolution on Earth, and another serious argument against it is that with this approach it is impossible to explain the creative nature of thinking, which turns out to be some kind of deviation from objective comprehension of the essence of things. Agnosticism turns out to be logically overcome by materialists by refusing to explain the essence of the creative process.

Let's go back to Hegel. He divides truth as correspondence to an object and truth as correspondence to a concept, and only truth in the second sense (Hegel calls it philosophical) is possible. Hegel distinguishes correctness from truth. Distinguishing truth from correctness, Hegel follows Plato.

The understanding of truth by Hegel corresponds to the idea of common sense about truth as something good, about an ideal to which one should strive. But the ideal itself is presented to Hegel as an objective ideal, realized in people and through them. Truth in Hegel, like in Plato, is an idea ("The idea is truth, for the truth is that objectivity corresponds to a concept, but everything real, since it is something true, is an idea"), but his truth is total. The true "as concrete" is a unity that unfolds in itself and preserves itself; totality". Since Hegel considered mental education - the Absolute Idea - to be true, he naturally stood on the position of rationalism ("only thought can know the highest, the truth" [2], and this determined his attitude to empirical science. Truth as totality is the highest kind for Hegel truth, which is not attainable for empirical science also because it deals only with particular objects. "The true ... is, on the contrary, just that which does not have such one-sided definitions and is not exhausted by them, but how totality combines in itself those definitions that dogmatism recognizes as unshakable and true in their separation. "[3] Hegel continued here the ideas known to the Gnostics." Truth is one, it is a plurality, and (so) for us, to teach us this unity through love through the multitude. "[4] Similar thoughts dominate in Indian philosophy.

Developing the Aristotelian idea of achieving truth as research, Hegel presented truth itself as a dialectical process: "Truth is the movement of truth in itself" [5]. The concept of truth as a process can be called the historical concept of truth, since it presupposes the development of the world (though not infinite). If we discard the Hegelian idea of the Absolute Truth as the beginning and end of the path, then within the framework of the evolutionary concept of truth, we will get an idea of truth as a process of transformation of the Big Bang energy into spiritual energy, carried out at each stage of evolution by sequentially inanimate nature, plants (which V.I. Vernadsky, in his doctrine of the biosphere, called transformers of solar energy into biological), animals and, finally, man.

Based on dialectics, Hegel tried to overcome the dilemma of true and false altogether. True and false constitute a unity, "and the false constitutes the moment of truth no longer as false" [6]. Since truth develops itself, insofar as what seems to us to be false is only a moment in the development of truth, and thus Hegel arrives at a statement opposite to that to which ancient skepticism came, namely: everything is true in its development.

Thus, the analysis shows that the consideration of the problem of truth in the philosophy of the New Time in its essential moments continued to develop along the same lines along which the consideration of this problem in ancient philosophy proceeded, although the conclusions to which the new philosophy came could be diametrically opposite ... All this indicates the complexity and confusion of the problem, in the further analysis of which we will try to highlight some pivotal directions that are important in terms of substantiating our point of view on its solution.

Summarizing what was discussed above, we can say that there are a large number of concepts of truth. If desired, they can be reduced to two (for example, materialistic and dialectical), to three (for example, the concept of conformity, the concept of consent, and the concept of utility), to four, five, etc. There are combinations that combine two

or three concepts. In principle, any great philosophical system has its own understanding of truth. It is, so to speak, a piggy bank of truths from which everyone can choose or construct their own idea.

LIST OF REFERENCES

1. Hartmann E. Philosophy of the Unconscious: In 2 volumes. V. 2. P. 418.
2. Hegel G. Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences: In 3 volumes. T. 1. M., 1975. P. 110
3. Hegel G. Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences: In 3 volumes. T. 1. M., 1975. P. 139
4. Quoted. Quoted from: Trofimova M.K. Historical and philosophical questions of Gnosticism. M., 1979.S. 35.
5. Hegel G. Phenomenology of spirit. SPb., 1913.S. 26.
6. Hegel G. Phenomenology of spirit. SPb., 1913.S. 21
7. Panjiyev, S. (2019). CONCEPTS OF TRUTH OF THE NEW TIME. Scientific Bulletin of Namangan State University, 1(7), 170-173.
8. Suhrob, P. (2022). GLOBALIZATION PROCESS AND NATIONAL-SPIRITUAL FACTORS. *Galaxy International Interdisciplinary Research Journal*, 10(12), 636-638.
9. Suhrob, P. (2022). THE NOOSPHERE STAGE AND THE INCREASING RESPONSIBILITY OF MANKIND IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE PLANET EARTH. *American Journal of Research in Humanities and Social Sciences*, 6, 55-58.
10. Панжиев, С. (2022). ҚАДРИЯТЛАРНИНГ ШАХС МАЪНАВИЙ ҚИЁФАСИНИ ЮКСАЛТИРИШДАГИ ЎЗИГА ХОС ЖИХАТЛАРИ. *Oriental renaissance: Innovative, educational, natural and social sciences*, 2(11), 863-866.
11. Suhrob, P. (2021). The philosophical content of truth and its forms. *World Bulletin of Social Sciences*, 4(11), 176-178.
12. Suhrob, P. (2024). Importance Of Globalization Process in Social Life. *Czech Journal of Multidisciplinary Innovations*, 29, 21-23.
13. Панжиев, С. (2024). ЁШ АВЛОД ҚАЛБИДА МИЛЛИЙ ҒУРУР ВА ИФТИХОР ТУЙҒУЛАРИНИ ШАКЛЛАНТИРИШДА НАВОИЙ МАЪНАВИЙ МЕРОСИНИНГ РОЛИ. *Oriental renaissance: Innovative, educational, natural and social sciences*, 4(5), 482-487.
14. Panjiyev, S. (2023). APPROACH TO THE QUESTION OF TRUTH IN THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.
15. Panjiyev, S. (2022). YUKSAK MA'NAVIYAT HAQIQAT MEZONI. *Oriental renaissance: Innovative, educational, natural and social sciences*, 2(12), 1156-1159.
16. Panjiyev, S. (2022). The relevance of the philosophical comprehension of truth. *Asian Journal of Multidimensional Research*, 11(12), 195-197.
17. Babamuratov, E., Ulmashon, D., & Zhurabek, Z. (2023). METHODS OF IDEOLOGICAL WORK FOR YOUTH WITH IDEOLOGICAL DEPRESSION. *World Bulletin of Social Sciences*, 27, 136-143.
18. Allamuratov, S. A., & Dzshuraeva, U. C. (2021). Irrigation and reclamation works in the surkhan oasis.